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Hoover v. Beto, 467 F.2d 516 (5th Cir.

1972).
Sam Hoover, an attorney, was found guilty in state court' of being
an accomplice in a robbery. The United States court of appeals denied
his petition for habeas corpus. In the rehearing, he asserts two claims
of error: (1) That the court erred in refusing to sustain alleged violations of his fourth and fourteenth amendment rights to be free from
unreasonable search and seizure; and (2) that his right to confrontation
under the sixth and fourteenth amendments was infringed when the
state court admitted into evidence the oral confession of the alleged
principal which also implicated Hoover. Accompanied by a warrant
(allegedly invalid under standards prescribed in Aguilar v. Texas2)
police officers went to Hoover's home and upon announcing their authority and possession of a warrant, Hoover told them that the search
warrant was unnecessary and for them to commence their search. Hoover
argues that because the warrant was later proven invalid, the prosecutor
could not rely on his consent induced by the misrepresentation that the
officers possessed a valid warrant. Pursuant to an established Texas exception to the hearsay rule which allows a principal's confession to
prove the principal's guilt as a predicate to trying an accomplice, the
principal's confession was received through testimony of a police officer. 3 The confession also implicated Hoover, who now claims that no
cross-examination could be maintained against the absent declarant,
and thus his right of confrontation was violated. Held-l) Consent to
a search and seizure can be shown, even though the alleged words of
consent are given after officers present what on its face appears to be a
valid search warrant. 2) The right to be confronted with witnesses is
not necessarily abridged when an out of court 4confession of a third
person is introduced and implicates the accused.
While it is clear that one may waive, by voluntary consent, his fourth
1 Hoover v. State, 390 S.W.2d 758 (Tex. Crim. App. 1965).
2 378 U.S. 108, 84 S. Ct. 1509, 12 L. Ed. 2d 723 (1964). The court in the instant case
further determined that the prosecution need not rely on Hoover's alleged consent, in
that Hoover's trial was decided before Aguilar.
3 The confessor-declarant, at the time of Hoover's trial, was incarcerated in a Texas
jail awaiting prosecution.
4 Hoover v. Beto, 467 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1972).
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amendment protection against unreasonable search and seizure, 5 cases
are by no means in agreement as to what constitutes an unequivocal
consent. In general, the determination of the validity of a waiver of
fourth amendment rights by consent rests on an entirety of circumstances. 6 In order to sustain the burden of proof on the issue of consent
under the entirety of circumstances approach, the prosecution must:
(1) Convince the court that the defendant's acts, by word or conduct
give sufficient indication of actual consent to the search and not merely
acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority;7 (2) If sufficient words or
acts of consent are found by the court, it must then determine whether
the consent was given under circumstances "free of duress and coercion."8
Although the Supreme Court has yet to formulate general constitutional standards governing state consent searches, it did hold in Bumper
v. North Carolina that acquiescence cannot be construed as consent
when the words allegedly constituting consent are given only after the
official conducting the search asserts that he has a warrant. Such claim
of authority is, in effect, an announcement that the occupant has no
right to resist the search, and because of the coercive nature of the very
existence of a search warrant, no consent is possible. 10
5 See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 68 S. Ct. 367, 92 L. Ed. 436 (1948); Zap v.
United States, 328 U.S. 624, 66 S. Ct. 1277, 90 L. Ed. 1477 (1946); Amos v. United States, 255
U.S. 313, 41 S. Ct. 266, 65 L. Ed. 654 (1921).
6 United States v. Lewis, 274 F. Supp. 184 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
Among the factors that may be considered in determining the effectiveness and
validity of a consent to search are whether at the time when it was given defendant
was under arrest . . . whether he was overpowered by arresting officers, handcuffed,
or similarly subjected to physical restraints . . . whether the keys to the premises
searched had already been seized by the police from the defendant . . . whether the
defendant employed evasive conduct or attempted to mislead police . . . and
whether he denied guilt or the presence of any incriminatory objects in his
premises ....
The presence of some or all of the aforementioned factors is not controlling, since
... each case must "stand or fall on its own special facts" ....
Id. at 187.
7 See Burg v. United States, 332 F.2d 171 (8th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 883
(1964); United States v. Page, 802 F.2d 81 (9th Cir. 1962).
8 See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S. Ct. 1019, 82 L. Ed. 1461 (1938); Wren v.
United States, 352 F.2d 617 (10th Cir. 1965); Channel v. United States, 285 F.2d 217 (9th
Cir. 1960); United States v. Blalock, 255 F. Supp. 268 (E.D. Pa. 1966). Those circumstances
that are primarily involved are consideration of the defendant's age, physical condition,
intelligence, whether there were any threats of violence or use of force by the police
officers, and whether there was any undue influence or pressure. See, e.g., Henley v. State,
228 So. 2d 602 (Miss. 1969); State v. Young, 425 S.W.2d 117 (Mo. 1968); State v. Sisneros,
446 P.2d 875 (N.M. 1968).
9 391 U.S. 543, 88 S. Ct. 1788, 20 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1968).
10 Id. at 548, 88 S. Ct. at 1792, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 802.
When a prosecutor seeks to rely upon consent to justify the lawfulness of a search,
he has the burden of proving that consent was, in fact, freely and voluntarily given.
This burden cannot be discharged by showing no more than acquiescence to a claim
of lawful authority. A search conducted in reliance upon a warrant cannot later be
justified on the basis of consent if it turns out that the warrant was invalid. The
result can be no different when it turns out that State does not even attempt to rely
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Although recognizing the "acquiescence as opposed to voluntary consent" concept, the majority of the court in the instant case rejected
the "presumption of involuntariness by the existence of a warrant"
approach of Bumper as applied to the facts in Hoover, and in essence,
held that the decision in Bumper did not have any far reaching effects
relating to "consent" questions. The court viewed Bumper as decided
by looking to the entirety of circumstances and its application was limited to those circumstances.
The majority announced that the facts in Bumper and the facts in
Hoover were clearly distinguishable. In Bumper incriminating evidence
was seized from the house of defendant's grandmother, an elderly woman
"of patently limited education"" who was neither a suspect at the time
nor an eventual defendant. When officers arrived at her home and
announced they had a search warrant, she replied, "Go ahead." The
warrant, of which there was considerable question as to its actual existence, was neither read by nor to the defendant's grandmother. In
Hoover the defendant was also the individual who gave "consent."
Rather than being one "of patently limited education," Hoover was
an experienced criminal attorney. When officers presented the warrant,
Hoover told them that the search warrant was unnecessary, for them
2
to come in and look wherever they pleased.1
The majority concedes that under the circumstances of Bumper, consent could not be shown; however Hoover's consent, or lack thereof,
because not significantly similar in circumstances to that of Bumper,
must rest upon the established Texas determination of consent as recognized in Stanford v. State:' 3
This court has frequently held that when a party was advised that
officers had a warrant to search the premises the mere statement
of the party that it was all right to go ahead was not regarded as a
waiver of the right to question the regularity of the warrant nor
of consent to search. On the other hand, where the party tells the
officer that a warrant to search is unnecessary, and no issue is made
on the question, consent is shown. The question turns on the point
as to whether the party really gives consent for the search, or merely
acquiesces
in the officer pursuing his legal rights under a valid
14
warrant.
upon the validity of the warrant or fails to show that there was, in fact any warrant
at all.
When a law enforcement officer claims authority to search a home under a warrant,
he announces in effect that the occupant has no right to resist the search. The situation is instinct with coercion-albeit colorably lawful coercion. Where there is
coercion there cannot be consent.
11 Hoover v. Beto, 467 F.2d 516, 522 (5th Cir. 1972).
12 Hoover v. Beto, 306 F. Supp. 980, 986 (S.D. Tex. 1969).
13 145 Tex. Crim. 306, 167 S.W.2d 517 (1942).
14 Id. at 309, 167 S.W.2d at 519 (citations omitted).
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In applying the Texas test, the majority determined the existence of
consent to search on the words chosen by the person to be searched,
a pre-Bumper method of determination consistent with the view of
looking to the entirety of circumstances. The majority arrived at the
conclusion that there was a valid consent, irrespective of the existence
of the warrant since there was no affirmative evidence in the record to
show that Hoover's utterances were anything but voluntary.' 5
The dissenting opinion asserted that no such limitation of Bumper
was intended by the Supreme Court. The dissent applied the holding
in Bumper as absolute, that "one cannot consent to a search in the
face of a seemingly valid search warrant."' 16 To buttress its argument
the dissent noted the preciseness of the Supreme Court in framing the
issue in Bumper: "The issue presented is whether a search can be
justified as lawful on the basis of consent when that 'consent' has been
given only after the official conducting the search has asserted that he
possesses a warrant. ' 17 Likewise, the dissent looked to the holding in
Bumper which they determined to be equally as precise: "When a law
enforcement officer claims authority to search a home under a warrant,
he announces in effect that the occupant has no right to resist the
search. The situation is instinct with coercion-albeit lawful coercion.
Where there is coercion there cannot be consent."' 8
The dissent concluded by observing the majority's suggestion that
because Hoover was a lawyer he knew of his rights. The dissent dismissed this argument by viewing the knowledge of a lawyer to be that
of knowing that a policeman bearing a search warrant has not only a
right but a duty to enter the premises and conduct a search regardless
of whether the occupant consents or not. Thus, without knowledge of
'5 Hoover v. Beto, 467 F.2d 516, 520 (5th Cir. 1972).
16 Id. at 545.
17 Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548, 88 S. Ct. 1788, 1791, 20 L. Ed. 2d 797,
802 (1968).
18 Id. at 550, 88 S.Ct. at 1792, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 803. In further support of the dissent's
opinion, reliance was placed on cases cited approvingly in Bumper. Meno v. State, 164
N.E. 93, 96 (Ind. 1925) (emphasis added):
One who, upon the command of an officer authorized to enter and search and seize
by search warrant, opens the door to the officer and acquiesces in obedience to such
a request, no matter what the language used in such asquiescence, is but showing a
regard for the supremacy of the law.

The presentation of a search warrant to those in charge at the place to be searched,
by one authorized to serve it, is tinged with coercion, and submission thereto cannot
be considered an invitation that would waive the constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures, but rather is to be considered a submission to the
law. (Omission by the court.)
Naples v. Maxwell, 271 F. Supp. 850, 856 (S.D. Ohio 1967):
[T]he question of consent cannot arise in the absence of a plain and clear showing
that the individual being subjected to the search has refused to recognize that the
search warrant is valid and binding. Stated otherwise, unless an accused, after being
served with a search warrant, unequivocally states that he believes that the search
warrant is unlawful and illegal, he cannot consent to the subsequent search.
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the contents of the affidavit, "Hoover's legal training commanded his
acquiescence."' 9
It is difficult to rationalize the majority holding in light of Bumper.
Nowhere in Bumper does the Supreme Court state that only in the
peculiar set of facts before them is the existence of a search warrant
coercive. It is not likely that the Supreme Court desired to limit the
applicability of its holding in Bumper to cases involving an alleged
consent given by one not a suspect or to one who is "patently limited
in education." In light of the unequivocal language of Bumper, the
only logical conclusion is that a search warrant is coercive per se and
defeats the ability to consent to a search and seizure.20
As to the right of an individual regarding confrontation, it is a fundamental rule of law that the accused has the right to be confronted
with those who testify against him. This right is secured by the sixth
21
amendment.
After Pointerv. Texas22 held that the confrontation clause was applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment, there followed
a series of decisions finding violation of the clause on constitutional
grounds.23 Although Pointer acknowledged the viability of a few standard and theretofore approved exceptions admitting statements that
were otherwise hearsay, 24 it failed to announce any principles insuring
adequate safeguards should the hearsay be admitted. In California v.
Green25 and Dutton v. Evans, 26 however, limiting principles were finally established. In Green the court held that the admission of hearsay
is not constitutionally objectionable if the declarant is subject to crossexamination at the trial, or if, when he is unavailable to testify, he was
subjected to cross-examination at the time the declaration was made. In
Dutton there was strong implication that the clause's apparent absolute
command that defendants be able to confront witnesses does not require
cross-examination of declarants, where the policies underlying the con19 Hoover v. Beto, 467 F.2d 516, 547 (5th Cir. 1972).
20 Furthermore, the court ignored an applicable piece of judicial philosophy which, had
the majority applied it, would have provided the basis for a different holding without
resorting to an analysis of Bumper. Higgins v. United States, 209 F.2d 819, 820 (D.C. Cir.
1944): "[N]o sane man who denies his guilt would actually be willing that policemen
search his room for contraband which is certain to be discovered. It follows that when
police identify themselves as such, search a room, and find contraband in it, ...
the
search, accompanied by a denial of guilt, do not show consent."
21 U.S. CONST. AMEND. VI.

22 380 U.S. 400, 85 S. Ct. 1065, 13 L. Ed. 2d 923 (1965).

23See, e.g., Roberts v. Russell, 392 U.S. 293, 88 S. Ct. 1921, 20 L. Ed. 2d 1100 (1968);
Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 88 S. Ct. 1318, 20 L. Ed. 2d 255 (1968); Douglas v. Alabama,
380 U.S. 415, 85 S. Ct. 1074, 13 L. Ed. 2d 934 (1965).
24 See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 85 S. Ct. 1065, 13 L. Ed. 2d 923 (1965) (approving
admission of dying declarations and testimony at a former trial by a now deceased
witness).
25 399 U.S. 149, 90 S. Ct. 1930, 26 L. Ed. 2d 489 (1970).
26400 U.S. 74, 91 S. Ct. 210, 27 L. Ed. 2d 213 (1970).
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frontation clause are otherwise sufficiently protected. The question that
will obviously arise, then, is does the particular exception in question
conform to the statements in the confrontation clause; if not, does it
otherwise protect the policy considerations inherent to the clause?
The court in the instant case was faced with determining the applicability of a well established Texas exception to the hearsay rule in
light of the confrontation clause:
The Texas rule permitting introduction of a principal's oral confession at the trial of the accomplice does not violate the Sixth
Amendment. The question before us, however, is whether the
Sixth Amendment made obligatory on the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, is violated by introduction27of a principal's
confession which also implicates the accomplice.
An exception to this general rule obtains where an accomplice is
being tried separately from his principal. 2 When the declarant does
not testify, relevant Supreme Court decisions reveal that hearsay evidence as to what he has said is inadmissible unless (1) the declarant
is legitimately unavailable, 29 and (2) there are strong indicia evincing
the truth of the matter asserted.8 0 The exception to the instant case
seemingly does not bind itself to this Supreme Court test on admissibility of declarant's testimony. The court in Browney v. State8 ' speculated as to what gave rise to the exception in question, and said:
If the rule permitting the introduction of the principal's confession
on the trial of the accomplice to establish the principal's guilt grew
out of the fact of the incompetency of the convicted principal to
testify as a witness, or 8his
nonavailability ...then no reason appears
for applying the rule. 2
Whatever the reasons giving rise to the Texas exception, such exception applies only where the person whose confession is sought to be
used is named in the indictment as a principal. 8 Statements in the
confession which might relate solely to the guilt of the accomplice and
84
which throw no light on the principal's guilt should be excluded. It
27 Hoover v. Beto, 467 F.2d 516, 528 (5th Cir. 1972).

28 Schepps v. State, 432 S.W.2d 926 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968). "This exception is apparently bottomed on the fact that the State has the burden of proving the guilt of the
principal in such case and, therefore, any testimony which would be admissible to show
the guilt of the principal, if he were on trial is admissible on the trial of the accomplice
for the purpose of showing the guilt of the principal." Id. at 940.
29 W. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EvIDENCE § 253, at 608 (2d ed.
E. Cleary 1972). The usual exceptions involving unavailability are dying declarations, statements of pedigree and family history, and former testimony.
80 Semerjian, Right of Confrontation, 55 A.B.A.J. 152 (1969).
81 128 Tex. Crim. 81, 79 S.W.2d 311 (1934).
82 Id. at 87, 79 S.W.2d at 314.
88 Smith v. State, 91 Tex. Crim. 15, 237 S.W. 265 (1922).
84 See Id.; Hoyt v. State, 88 Tex. Crim. 612, 228 S.W. 936 (1921).
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has been held that if such deletions render the confession incomplete
or fragmentary, then the confession in its entirety is admissible. In all
cases, however, where the principal's confession is received into evidence, the trial court is required to guard the rights of the accomplice
on trial by limiting in its charge the purpose of the confession to establish the principal's guilt alone, which is a necessary requisite to trying
one as an accomplice.8 5
The majority in the instant case prefaced its discussion on the constitutional validity of the Texas rule by noting that the court had approved confessions which were otherwise admissible, where reference
to co-defendants had been removed. They stated further, that even in
the face of Supreme Court decisions to the contrary, the same result is
achievable when, rather than deleting the statement, they are subject
to limiting instructions by the trial court to regard the entire confession
only as evidence against the confessor-declarant.8 6 In Bruton v. United
States,37 two defendants, Bruton and Evans, were jointly tried for violation of postal laws. The oral confession of Evans was introduced by way of
testimony from a postal inspector. The confession incriminated Bruton
as well. The jury was instructed to consider the confession only with
respect to Evans and to disregard all references to Bruton. The Court
said that "the naive assumption that prejudicial effects can be overcome
by instructions to the jury ...all practicing lawyers know to be unmitigated fiction;8 8 because of the substantial risk that the jury, despite
instructions to the contrary, looked to the incriminating extrajudicial
statements in determining petitioner's guilt, admission of Evan's confession in this joint trial violated petitioner's right of cross-examination
secured by the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment." 39 The
court in the instant case distinguished Bruton by stating:
Trial of principals and accomplices is inherently different from a
trial of co-conspirators or co-defendants. While co-conspirators are
coequals in crime as a matter
of substantive criminal law, principals
40
and accomplices are not.

The justification for the court's holding that Hoover's sixth amendment
right was protected by virtue of the trial court's limiting instructions
was that the court found that none of the jurors, when subjected to voir
dire examination expressed reservation about following the trial court's
instructions, hence those limiting instructions would cure any possible
35 Smith v. State, 91 Tex. Crim. 15, 237 S.W. 265 (1922).
36 Hoover v. Beto, 467 F.2d 516, 530 (5th Cir. 1972).
37 391 U.S. 123, 88 S. Ct. 1620, 20 L. Ed. 2d 476 (1968).
38 Id. at 129, 88 S. Ct. at 1624, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 481.
39 Id. at 126, 88 S. Ct. at 1622, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 479.
40 Hoover v. Beto, 467 F.2d 516, 530 (5th Cir. 1972).
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adverse effect due to the admission of the principal's oral confession. 41
Thus, the court determined that while limiting instructions in joint
trials will not cure the taint of the incriminating statement made by a
co-defendant, instructions cure any such taint involving separate trials
of principal and accomplice.
The majority looked for support for validating the Texas exception
to Californiav. Green42 and Dutton v. Evans. 43 In Green, the Supreme

Court, in an opinion by Justice White enunciated a rather different
view of the relation between confrontation and cross-examination than
had been developed by the Court previously. Justice White stated:
The issue before us is... whether a defendant's constitutional right
"to be confronted with the witness against him" is necessarily inconsistent with a State's decision to change its hearsay rules to reflect the minority view described above. While it may readily be
conceded that hearsay rules and the confrontation clause are generally designed to protect similar values, it is quite a different thing
to suggest that the overlap is complete and that the confrontation
clause is nothing more or less than a codification of the rules of
hearsay and their
existing exceptions as they existed historically
44
at common law.

In Dutton the Court upheld the admission of the witness' hearsay
testimony as to a statement made to him by one of the alleged accomplices of the defendant. Justice Stewart stated that "[t]his Court has
never indicated that the limited contours of the hearsay exception...
are required by the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause. ' 45 Instead, "the mission of the Confrontation Clause is to advance a practical
concern for the accuracy of the truth-determining process in criminal
trials by assuring that the trier of fact [has] a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the prior statement."46 Thus, we have in Dutton a
decision holding that hearsay evidence may be admissible even though
there was no cross-examination when the statement was made and the
declarant did not appear at trial.
The majority looked to this in rationalizing its decision in Hoover
by stating that "it is obvious that if the framers of the Constitution had
desired to protect the right of 'cross-examination' rather than 'confron'47
tation' the Sixth Amendment would been drafted to that effect.
Rather, since the policy underlying the confrontation clause is now
41 Id. at 530.

399 U.S. 149, 90 S. Ct. 1930, 26 L. Ed. 2d 489 (1970).
43 400 U.S. 74, 91 S. Ct. 210, 27 L. Ed. 2d 213 (1970).
44 California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155, 90 S. Ct. 1930, 1933, 26 L. Ed. 2d 489, 495
(1970).
45 Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 82, 91 S. Ct. 210, 216, 27 L. Ed. 2d 213, 223 (1970).
46 Id. at 89, 91 S. Ct. at 220, 27 L. Ed. 2d at 227.
47 Hoover v. Beto, 467 F.2d 516, 532 (5th Cir. 1972).
42
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clearly set forth in Dutton the 'satisfactory basis' is not violated where
there are adequate substitutes for cross-examination. 48 The majority
determined that the "satisfactory basis" is afforded by "presumed trustworthiness which results from common sense recognition of basic characteristics of human nature underlying most exceptions to the hearsay
rule. '49 "Voluntariness is the first and foremost safeguard and 'indicia
of reliability' of a confession ....

But voluntariness alone is not enough

to establish the competency and trustworthiness of the evidence. The
confession must also be corroborated." 50 The majority concluded by
noting that the evidence of Hoover's guilt was so overwhelming, separate and apart from the confession of the principal, that any violation
51
of rights regarding the admission of the hearsay was harmless error.
The dissent is in complete disharmony with the majority in regard
to Hoover's right of confrontation. It boldly states that "applying the
Texas rule so as to admit confessions of an available witness violates
the constitution although it is admitted solely to prove that he [the
52
witness present but not testifying] committed the adjunct crime.
The view that the dissent adopts is, that if the declarant is available
he must testify, or the hearsay is inadmissible. If the declarant is legitimately unavailable, there must be strong indicia of reliability before
hearsay may be introduced against the defendant. The indicia of reliability are not met by introducing a confession that was neither given
nor acknowledged under oath, even if it is wholly voluntary53
The dissent urges that the law cannot permit the jury to hear a principal's reference to the accomplice, even if it would render the confession fragmentary. Where the majority disavows the applicability of
Bruton because of distinctions in the substantive law, the dissent finds
that "[the principal's] statements were no less damaging because he was
48 Id. at 532.
49 Hoover v. Beto, 467 F.2d 516, 533 (5th Cir. 1972).

Id. at 533. At Hoover's trial, the principal's confession was corroborated by testimony
l0
of other witnesses and by introduction of physical evidence which the majority found
"'would tend to establish the trustworthiness of the statement" and thus afford the satisfactory basis. Id. at 534.
51 Hoover v. Beto, 467 F.2d 516, 537 (5th Cir. 1972).
52 Id. at 551.

53 Id. at 553 (dissenting opinion). To support this, the dissent adopts the sweeping statement of California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158, 90 S. Ct. 1930, 1935, 26 L. Ed. 2d 489, 497
(1970):
Confrontation: (1) insures that the witness will give his statements under oath-thus
impressing him with the seriousness of the matter and guarding the lie by the possibility of a penalty for perjury; (2) forces the witness to submit to cross-examination,
the "greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of the truth;" (3) permits
the jury that is to decide the defendant's fate to observe the demeanor of the witness
in making his statement, thus aiding in assessing his credibility.
It is, of course, true that the out-of-court statement may have been made under
circumstances subject to none of these protections. But if the declarant is present and
testifying at trial, the out-of-court statement for all practical purposes regains most
of its lost protection.
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